经济学人经济类文章精选5

Moneys muddled message

BACK in 2002 Ben Bernanke, then still a Federal Reserve governor, declared that “under a paper-money system, a determined government can always generate higher spending and hence positive inflation.” That does not mean it is easy.

O n March 18th America’s inflation rate was reported at 0.2%, year on year, in February. The same day the Fed said “inflation could persist for a time” at uncomfortably low levels. Yet some economists and investors insist high inflation, even hyperinflation, is lurking in the wings. They have two sources of concern. The first is motive: the world is deleveraging, ie, trying to reduce the ratio of its debts to income. Policymakers might secretly prefer to do that through higher inflation, which lifts nominal incomes, than through the painful processes of cutting spending and retiring debt, or default. The second is captured by the Fed’s announcement that it plans to purchase $300 billion in Treasury bonds and an additional $850 billion of mortgage-related debt, bringing such purchases to $1.75 trillion in total, all paid for by printing money. It is not alone: around the world, central-bank balance-sheets have ballooned (see chart).

This is scary stuff to those who swear by Milton Friedman’s dictum that “inflati on is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” But the role of the money supply in creating inflation is less obvious than monetarism suggests.

The quantity theory of money holds that the money supply, multiplied by the rate at which it circulates (called velocity), equals nominal income. Nominal income in turn is the product of real output and prices. But does money supply directly boost nominal income, or does nominal income affect velocity and the demand for money? The mechanism is murky.

Central banks control the narrowest measure of the money supply, called the monetary base—typically, currency plus the reserves that commercial banks hold with the central bank. But the relationships between the monetary base, broader monetary aggregates and nominal income is highly unstable.

Central banks have mostly given up trying to target inflation via the money supply. Instead, they study the “output gap” between total demand and the economy’s potential to supply goods and services, determined by such things as the labour force and capital stock, as well as inflation expectations. When demand exceeds supply, inflation rises. When it falls short, inflation falls, and in the extreme becomes deflation. To influence demand, the central banks move a short-term interest rate up or down by adjusting the supply of bank reserves. Changes in the policy rate ripple out to all interest rates paid by borrowers.

The financial crisis has bunged up that transmission mechanism. Risk aversion, fear of default and depleted bank capital have caused private borrowing rates to deviate sharply from policy rates. Central banks have responded by expanding loans to financial institutions, purchasing private securities and buying government debt. They have financed this growth in their assets through increased liabilities such as commercial-bank reserves, swaps with central banks and other ways of printing money.

Is this monetarism? It depends on whom you ask. The Fed calls its policy “credit easing” to emphasise that, though its policy rate is almost zero, it is using different channels to ease credit and boost spending. Even its Treasury purchases are to “improve conditions in private credit markets”. That these actions expand the money supply is secondary. Similarly, the Bank of Japan is buying stocks and may make subordinated loans to banks to boost their capital and lending capacity; the

money supply is not a consideration. The Bank of England, on the other hand, calls its purchases of government and private debt “quantitative easing” a nd explains it in monetarist terms. It expands investors’ holdings of money, encouraging them to shift to other assets, boosting wealth and investment. It acknowledges this may not work. Indeed, merely the news that it would purchase government debt drove down long-term interest rates, just as the Fed’s announcement did, an entirely conventional stimulus to demand. The rhetoric may be different but the policies are largely the same.

If the unprecedented monetary and fiscal stimulus works, output gaps will eventually close. Then central banks will have to reverse their unconventional policies and raise interest rates. They may hesitate in the face of political pressure or an explicit decision to err on the side of inflation rather than deflation. In that case, inflation will rise.

Go forth and multiply

But for the moment deflation is a bigger threat. If the Fed’s current policies fail, fiscal policy can be employed to boost demand. There, too, the Fed has a role: it could buy the bonds needed to finance tax cuts or government spending, thereby limiting the impact on long-term rates. Such debt monetisation evokes fears of hyperinflation. But inflation would result only if monetisation boosted aggregate demand enough to exceed aggregate supply. Laurence Meyer of Macroeconomic Advisers, a consultancy, reckons America’s output gap will reach 9% of GDP by next year. To eliminate that he says the Fed would have to monetise more than $1 trillion of additional stimulus over two years, assuming standard multiplier effects.

The obstacles are primarily political, not economic. Finance ministers are averse to debt and central banks even more so to monetising it for fear of becoming a tool of the government. That aversion is usually healthy but not when deflation looms. The option should be on the table, as long as there are safeguards for the Fed’s independence. Frederic Mishkin, a former Fed governor now at Columbia University, says the important thing is that the Fed, not the Treasury, be the initiator of such purchases, and only after stating that it is consistent with price stability.

On March 15th Mr Bernanke said that the biggest risk facing the economy now is that “we don’t have the political will, we don’t have the commitment to solve this problem.” At least for the mo ment, it is not the Fed chief’s gumption that is lacking.

Top watchdog

ON GLOBAL regulation, America is usually seen as the foot-dragger. Tim Geithner, the treasury secretary, sought to dispel this impression on March 14th, telling his Group of 20 counterparts he wanted “a much stronger form of oversight and clear rules of the game”.

Credit this change of heart to the bruising experiences of the last year. On March 17th he reminded Congress of the need for an expanded resolution authority so that regulators could take over any systemically important financial institution, pay off its creditors and sell its assets, even if it were not technically a bank as was the case with Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and American International Group (AIG). He also wants to create a “systemic risk regulator”, empowered to snoop into the secretive areas of finance, such as hedge funds, imposing safety measures, such as capital requirements, where necessary.

Administration officials appear to favour the Fed for this role. So does Barney Frank, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, though he says political support for the idea has been hurt by the Fed's handling of AIG.

But there are many questions over the merits of a systemic-risk regulator. First, could it hope to

forestall a crisis? None of the banks foresaw today’s mess, even though their survival was at stake. Regulators, meanwhile, looked the wrong way: they were far more worried by hedge funds than subprime mortgages. That tends to be typical.

Second, which institutions would be covered by the new regime, how would they pay for the privilege (if at all), and would they then be viewed as too big to fail? Peter Wallison of the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank, worries that those most closely scrutinised could borrow more cheaply, squeeze out competitors, and eventually become as risky as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two giant mortgage agencies.

Third, is the Fed right for the job? Its own regulatory record is unimpressive: it was Citigroup’s principal regulator. Its new duties could draw it into political fights that could compromise its independence. They may also conflict with monetary policy; it may keep interest rates low to prevent a firm from failing, though that could risk stoking higher inflation.

On the other hand, as the lender of last resort only the Fed can inject money into virtually any type of firm; it might be good to give it corresponding authority to prevent abuse, too. Moreover, the Fed’s regulatory record is not the worst. AIG, f or example, owned a tiny thrift which meant that the parent and the unit that produced its derivatives book were overseen by the Office of Thrift Supervision. The OTS also supervised the two biggest banks to fail so far: IndyMac and Washington Mutual. Such cases suggest that banks shop for the friendliest regulator (though the OTS disputes that). Adding one more—even an overarching one—may do little good unless the whole regime is streamlined.

Swissie fit

IT IS not easy being Swiss. Every other country complains about your bank-secrecy laws. If you live in Zurich, the nice houses by the lake are taken by rich foreigners and you have to put up with something more modest and farther out.

Worse still, in a crisis, everyone buys your currency, in effect tightening your monetary policy. UBS excepted, Switzerland did not indulge in an Anglo-Saxon-style speculative boom over the past decade. But it is suffering nevertheless. The Swiss National Bank thinks the economy will contract by between 2.5% and 3% this year. Consumer prices are expected to fall by 0.5% in 2009; in other words, the economy is suffering from deflation.

But now, to recall the movie “Network” (featuring a different UBS), the Swiss are mad as hell and they are not going to take it any more. In February residents of the Zurich canton voted to stop foreigners from having the right to pay tax as a lump sum related to the value of their property, rather than having their income and wealth properly assessed in the same way as Swiss citizens do. The bigger move, however, came on March 12th. The national bank vowed to intervene in the currency markets in order to prevent the Swiss franc from appreciating further against the euro. That made the Swiss the first big economy in the crisis to opt for explicit depreciation. The Swiss have tried before to discourage the use of the franc as a haven currency. Back in the 1970s they charged foreigners a fee for having a bank account, in effect imposing a negative interest rate. Some analysts argue the Swiss are only doing what other central banks are attempting—boosting the economy by printing money to buy their own government and high-grade corporate bonds, a trick known as “quantitative easing” . As in other countries, Swiss interest rates were virtually down to zero, so new measures were needed.

But the virtuous nature of Swiss public finances means there are not many domestic government bonds available to buy back. In addition, Mansoor Mohi-uddin of UBS points out, there are only

SFr17 billion ($14.4 billion) of domestic non-financial corporate bonds outstanding; that compares with a total money supply of SFr642 billion. Buying foreign bonds (and selling Swiss francs) is thus a logical step to expand liquidity.

Adarsh Sinha of Barclays Capital thinks the Swiss move will not be the start of a tit-for-tat round of devaluations. First, because Switzerland is a small country in terms of global trade, depreciation of the franc will not have a big effect on the competitive position of other countries. Second, Switzerland is a relatively open economy and depreciation will have more effect, when it comes to countering deflation risks, than it would for the United States or the euro zone.

Nevertheless, there are some troubling aspects to the Swiss move. First, Switzerland’s current-account surplus is forecast to be 8.7% of GDP this year. Normally, it is deficit countries that need to devalue. How will global imbalances be corrected if surplus countries try to depreciate? Secondly, to state the obvious, all currencies cannot fall. If the Swiss franc is no longer a safe bet, traders will find something else. They will not all choose gold. If the Swiss were unable to stand the pressure of being a currency bolthole, why should other countries be able to do so?

The question is all the more urgent because many countries face the same problem. Others may be tempted to argue, like the Swiss, that they have technical reasons to weaken their currencies. In New Zealand, for example, the central bank has lowered interest rates more than five percentage points but the local currency is still appreciating. The economy is probably in its fifth quarter of recession and the Royal Bank of Canada thinks the New Zealand central bank may have to resort to foreign-exchange intervention.

Back in the 1930s many countries had to choose whether or not to abandon the gold standard. Those that did so soonest tended to suffer least during the Depression. In these days of floating currencies, it is no longer necessary to announce a formal devaluation; benign neglect can allow the currency to fall. Some Europeans suspect this has been happening with the British pound.

But it is still a form of subtle protectionism, relying on someone else to take the strain. To raise the most worrying example, Chinese exports are down by more than a quarter from a year ago. What if the Beijing authorities decided that, in order to generate their targeted 8% economic growth, a bit of depreciation was required? After all, what’s good for the Swiss…

Cranking up the outrage-o-meter 愤怒测量器启动了

THIS crisis has brought a burst of creativity in the development of indicators of pain, from the subprime implode-o-meter to the downgrade-o-meter for structured securities. Perhaps it is time for the outrage-o-meter. Its needle would have jumped off the scale this week as America’s public, politicians and media huffed and puffed over the $165m in bonuses paid to members of the financial-products division that brought down American International Group (AIG). Troubles in that unit have forced the government to bail out the giant insurer, so far to the tune of $173 billion. AIG’s wayward eggheads are not the only ones squirming. The affair is a test of the Obama administration’s handling of financial excess—and so far it has been ham-fisted. After flip-flopping over whether it had the authority to meddle with employment contracts, the Treasury eventually seized on a clause in the recently passed stimulus bill that may allow it to retrieve payments deemed contrary to the public interest. Tim Geithner, the treasury secretary, promised to recoup the money by deducting some of it from the next $30 billion tranche of aid for the company.

This is unlikely to assuage critics. The employees get to keep the bonuses while AIG is deprived of funds that were suppos edly essential to keeping it afloat. The government’s back and forth has also damaged the credibility of the Federal Reserve, which has lent heavily to AIG and was aware of the

bonuses several weeks ago.（换段）Mr Geithner’s hand was forced by an increasingly hysterical Congress. Charles Grassley, a senior Republican, set the tone by suggesting that AIG executives apologise Japanese-style, first bowing and then perhaps committing suicide. The language was no less salty at a congressional hearing on AIG on March 18th, at which the firm’s chief executive, Edward Liddy, faced a rough ride despite being in the job only a few months and working for a salary of $1.

As the uproar grew, lawmakers began crafting bills that would impose taxes of up to 100% on the bonuses. Andrew Cuomo, New York’s hyperactive attorney-general, entered the fray, slapping subpoenas on the firm and muttering about possible fraud. His office stoked public ire by revealing that 73 employees had received over $1m, and that $57m of its “retention”payments were earmarked for staff it planned to lay off. At the hearing, Mr Liddy said he had asked all those who received more than $100,000 to give back at least half, and that some—no doubt motivated by death threats and the unwelcome attention of paparazzi—had offered to return the full amount. But he also worried that they would leave AIG, making it harder to manage the toxic financial-products business.@（换段）shocking though the bonuses have been, they pale in comparison with the $49.5 billion of payments that AIG has made to counterparties in its disastrous foray into credit-default swaps—many of them foreign banks (see chart). This was no accident: it was precisely bailing out these trading partners that the government viewed as necessary to avoid a systemic meltdown. Still, the transfers—including almost $13 billion to Goldman Sachs, making it, as one newspaper put it, a “charity case”—are likely to receive more scrutiny as the bonus storm subsides.

The furore over AIG is awkward for the new administration in several ways. First, it makes it harder to pin responsibility for botched financial rescues on the Bush team. The new lot could have nipped the bonus fiasco in the bud. It also leaves Mr Obama walking a fine line between convincing the public that he shares their sense of outrage while also possibly pressing for more rescue funds. The government’s best guess is that another $750 billion could be needed. Insurers are clamouring for funds too. But bail-out fatigue is growing. The hearing’s chairman, Paul Kanjorski, suggested that the AIG mess could force Congress to reconsider any future largesse.

It does not help that Mr Geithner’s star is falling. His failure to get ahead of the problems at AIG follows his botched unveiling of a bank-rescue plan. Regaining his credibility will depend on the success of two new schemes: one to boost consumer lending by reviving securitisation, and another to remove toxic assets from banks (details of which are expected any day). Here, too, the government faces a balancing act: it needs to make the terms attractive enough to bring in private buyers, but not so attractive that they invite more political fireworks.

Another risk is that restrictions placed on firms that receive public money backfire. Banks are responding to new executive-bonus limits by increasing salaries. This “flies in the face of making pay more performance-related,”says Pearl Meyer of Steven Hall & Partners, a consultancy. Chafing under restrictions on their activities, recipients of funds from the previous government’s Troubled Asset Relief Programme are scrambling to repay them early. This may cheer taxpayers, but the withdrawal of capital may also hurt lending. @（换段）No wonder Mr Obama is keen to move the debate on. The focus now, he said on March 18th, should be on giving the government the tools to prevent a repeat: resolution authority over non-banks, similar to the power the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has to shake up sick banks. Mr Liddy, meanwhile, will be urged to earn his dollar by disposing of AIG’s assets and cutting the group’s vast debt to the taxpayer. Such deals have so far proved elusive. This week’s brouhaha is unlikely to make the task eas ier.

考研英语经济学人文章阅读训练五十

Convalescent plasma and artificial antibodies:Survivors as saviours 恢复期血浆和人工抗体：康复者成为了人们的救星 During the flu pandemic of1918-19doctors at an American naval hospital developed a treatment which,according to the American Journal of Public Health,had“a decided influence in shortening the course of the disease and in lowering the mortality”. 据《美国公共卫生杂志》报道称，在1918年至1919年的流感大流行期间，美国一家海军医院的医生研发了一种能够“有效缩短疾病病程并降低患者死亡率”的治疗方法。It involved clotting and then centrifuging blood from people who had got over the disease so as to separate out the antibodies it contained,then giving those antibodies to patients in dire need. 该方法是对处于恢复期的病人的血液进行采集和离心，进而分离出含有抗体的血浆，然后将其用于那些亟待治疗的患者。 Since then antibody-rich“convalescent plasma”(CP)has been used as a treatment for various diseases,including SARS and the pandemic strains of H1N1and H5N1influenza.Now covid-19has joined the list. 从那时起，富含抗体的“恢复期血浆”被广泛用于治疗包括SARS以及H1N1和H5N1流感大流行在内的各种疾病。如今，新冠肺炎也也位列其中。 A recent study in Wuhan found that severely ill covid-19patients treated with CP did significantly better than patients matched with them by age, gender and severity of infection had done earlier in the epidemic. 最近在武汉进行的一项研究发现，相比疫情早期那些年龄、性别和病情相当的新冠肺炎患者，接受恢复期血浆治疗的重症患者的治疗效果明显要好一些。

经济学人经济类文章精选3

What went wrong IN RECENT months many economists and policymakers, including such unlikely bedfellows as Paul Krugman, an economist and New York Times columnist, and Hank Paulson, a former American treasury secretary, have put “global imbalances”—the huge current-account surpluses run by countries like China, alongside America’s huge deficit—at the root of the financial crisis. But the IMF disagrees. It argues, in new papers released on Friday March 6th, that the “main culprit” was deficient regulation of t he financial system, together with a failure of market discipline. Olivier Blanchard, the IMF's chief economist, said this week that global imbalances contributed only “indirectly” to the crisis. This may sound like buck-passing by the world’s main interna tional macroeconomic organisation. But the distinction has important consequences for whether macroeconomic policy or more regulation of financial markets will provide the solutions to the mess. In broad strokes, the global imbalances view of the crisis argues that a glut of money from countries with high savings rates, such as China and the oil-producing states, came flooding into America. This kept interest rates low and fuelled the credit boom and the related boom in the prices of assets, such as houses and equity, whose collapse precipitated the financial crisis. A workable long-term fix for the problems of the world economy would, therefore, involve figuring out what to do about these imbalances. But the IMF argues that imbalances could not have caused the crisis without the creative ability of financial institutions to develop new structures and instruments to cater to investors’ demand for higher yields. These instruments turned out to be more risky than they appeared. Investors, overly optimistic about continued rises in asset prices, did not look closely into the nature of the assets that they bought, preferring to rely on the analysis of credit-rating agencies which were, in some cases, also selling advice on how to game the ratings system. This “failure of market discipline”, the fund argues, played a big role in the crisis. As big a problem, according to the IMF, was that financial regulation was flawed, ineffective and too limited in scope. What it calls the “shadow banking system”—the loosely regulated but highly interconnected network of investment banks, hedge funds, mortgage originators, and the like—was not subject to the sorts of prudential regulation (capital-adequacy norms, for example) that applied to banks. In part, the fund argues, this was because they were not thought to be systemically important, in the sense that banks were understood to be. But their being unregulated made it more attractive for banks (whose affiliates the non-banks often were) to evade capital requirements by pushing risk into these entities. In time, this network of institutions grew so large that they were indeed systemically important: in the now-familiar phrase, they were “too big” or “too interconnected” to fail. By late 2007, some estimates of the assets of the bank-like institutions in America outside the scope of existing prudential regulation, was around $10 trillion, as large as the assets of the regulated American banking system itself. Given this interpretation, it is not surprising that the IMF has thrown its weight strongly behind an enormous increase in the scale and scope of financial regulation in a series of papers leading up to the G20 meetings. Among many other proposals, it wants the shadow banking system to be subjected to the same sorts of prudential requirements that banks must follow. Sensibly, it is calling for regulation to concentrate on what an institution does, not what it is called (that is, the basis of regulation should be activities, not entities). It also wants regulators to focus more broadly on

2019经济学人考研英文文章阅读八十五

Leopard seals share their suppers 豹海豹会分享它们的晚餐 Bad news if you are a penguin 假如你是一只企鹅，这真是个坏消息 Leopard seals resemble their terrestrial namesakes in two ways.They have polka-dot pelts.And they are powerful,generally solitary carnivores that are quite capable of killing a human being if they so choose—as has indeed happened once,in2003,when a British marine biologist was the victim. 豹海豹与生活在陆地上的同名动物（豹）有着两点相似之处。其一，它们的皮毛上都有着圆点花纹。其二，它们都是强大的独栖性食肉动物，只要它们愿意，是完全有能力杀死一个人的——正如2003年真实发生的那样，当时一位英国海洋生物学家就成了受害者。 Curiously,though,there have also been reports of leopard seals behaving in a friendly manner towards people—apparently trying to present gifts,in the form of prey,to divers. 但奇怪的是，也有报道称豹海豹对人类表现得十分友好——它们很显然把猎物作为礼物赠送给了潜水员。 Until now,there has been no explanation for this philanthropy.But work just published in Polar Biology by James Robbins of Plymouth University, in Britain,suggests that what the seals are actually looking for is a dining partner.

经济学人科技类文章中英双语

The Brain Activity Map 绘制大脑活动地图 Hard cell 棘手的细胞 An ambitious project to map the brain is in the works. Possibly too ambitious 一个绘制大脑活动地图的宏伟计划正在准备当中，或许有些太宏伟了 NEWS of what protagonists hope will be America’s next big science project continues to dribble out. 有关其发起人心中下一个科学大工程的新闻报道层出不穷。 A leak to the New York Times, published on February 17th, let the cat out of the bag, with a report that Barack Obama’s administration is thinking of sponsoring what will be known as the Brain Activity Map. 2月17日，《纽约时报》刊登的一位线人报告终于泄露了秘密，报告称奥巴马政府正在考虑赞助将被称为“大脑活动地图”的计划。 And on March 7th several of those protagonists published a manifesto for the project in Science. 3月7日，部分发起人在《科学》杂志上发表声明证实了这一计划。 The purpose of BAM is to change the scale at which the brain is understood. “大脑活动地图”计划的目标是改变人们在认知大脑时采用的度量方法。 At the moment, neuroscience operates at two disconnected levels. 眼下，神经学的研究处在两个断开的层次。 The higher one, where the dimensions of features are measured in centimetres, has many techniques at its disposal, notably functional magnetic-res onance imaging, which measures changes in tissues’ fuel consumption. 在相对宏观的层次当中各个特征的规模用厘米来衡量，有很多技术可以使用，尤其是用来测量组织中能量消耗变动情况的核磁共振成像技术。 This lets researchers see which bits of the brain are active in particular tasks—as long as those tasks can be performed by a person lying down inside a scanner. 该技术可使研究人员找出在完成具体的任务时，大脑的哪些部分处于活跃状态。At the other end of the scale, where features are measured in microns, lots of research has been done on how individual nerve cells work, how messages are sent from one to another, and how the connections between cells strengthen and weaken as memories are formed. 而另一个度量的层次则要求用微米来测量各种特征，这一层次的研究很多都是关于单个神经细胞是如何工作的、信息在神经细胞之间是如何传递的以及当产生记忆的时候神经细胞之间的联系是如何得到加强和减弱的。 Between these two, though, all is darkness. 然而，位于这两个层次之间的研究还处于一片漆黑当中。 It is like trying to navigate America with an atlas that shows the states, the big cities and the main highways, and has a few street maps of local neighbourhoods, but displays nothing in between.

考研英语经济学人文章阅读训练2020021502

Youngsters’job preferences and prospects are mismatched 年轻人的工作偏好与就业前景不相匹配 Teenage picks 青少年的选择 The world of work is changing.Are people ready for the new job outlook? A survey of15-year-olds across41countries by the OECD,a club of mostly rich countries,found that teenagers may have unrealistic expectations about the kind of work that will be available. 职业的世界正在发生变化。人们做好准备接受新的就业观了吗？世界经合组织（一个以发达国家为主的组织）对41个国家的15岁青少年进行了一项调查，结果发现青少年对于未来可能从事的工作抱有不切实际的期望。 Four of the five most popular choices were traditional professional roles: doctors,teachers,business managers and lawyers. Teenagers clustered around the most popular jobs,with the top ten being chosen by47%of boys and53%of girls.Those shares were significantly higher than when the survey was conducted back in2000. 在五个最受欢迎的职业选择中有四个是传统的职业角色：医生、教师、企业经理和律师。青少年对于最受欢迎工作的选择呈现了聚集性，有47％的男孩和53％的女孩选择了排在前十位的职业。这一比例显著高于2000年调查时的水平。 The rationale for this selection was partly down to wishful thinking on the part of those surveyed(designers,actors and musical performers were three of the top15jobs).Youth must be allowed a bit of hope. 受访者做出这一选择往往是出于自己的一厢情愿（最受欢迎的15个职业中有3个分别是设计师、演员和歌手）。我们必须给年轻人一点希望。

高中英语 【高考阅读拔高训练】精选外刊篇章解析 经济学人：Rural education in China

经济学人：中国乡村教育 写在前面的话： 篇章阅读一直是高考英语拉分重点，也是同学们一直头疼的问题。对于阅读部分，同学们一方面要掌握答题技巧，扩充词汇量，另一方面也要拓展自己的阅读面，尤其是阅读一些外刊原文，体会英文地道表达和文章结构的呈现方式。虽然一开始会很难，但是长期坚持下去，阅读能力就会有质的提升！ 对于本资料的使用： 如果你是阅读一般，平时不能完全看懂文章，答题正确率较低的同学，先不要阅读原文，直接阅读每个段落的词汇详解部分，打好词汇基础。然后看每个段落的句子分析，再打开本文，进行阅读，回顾词汇及句子分析，感受原文风采。 如果你是阅读能力强，词汇储备量高，答题正确率高的同学，可直接阅读本篇外刊文章，挑战自己，尽最大能力去理解文章中的句子含义，了解文章大意。之后再看下面的词汇详细介绍，查缺补漏。如此，进一步提升自己的阅读能力，强化语言实力。 So, are you ready now ? Let's read it! 篇章总览 来源：本文来自经济学人2017.4.15. 主要内容：中国乡村教育现状。 语言特点：中国特色表达；高频中等词汇；写作亮点短语；固定搭配短语；熟词僻义。Rural education in China ：Separate and unequal Last year some images spread on the internet in China. They showed children descending an 800-metre (2,600-foot) rock face on rickety ladders made of vines, wood and rusty metal. Their destination: school. The photographer was told by a local official that "seven or eight" people had died after losing their grip. Yet the children did this regularly—there is no school at the top of the mountain in Sichuan province where they live. The photographs conveyed two striking aspects of life in the Chinese countryside: a hunger for education so strong that children will risk their lives for it, and a lack of government attention to the needs of rural students. In many ways, education in China is improving. Since 2000 the annual tally of students graduating from university has increased nearly eightfold, to more than 7.5 million. But many rural students are neglected by China's school system, and they are not the only ones. So too are the children of migrants who have moved to the cities from the countryside and poor students who want to go to senior high school. This is not only unfair; it is also counterproductive. China faces a demographic crunch: its workforce is shrinking and it can no longer depend on cheap, low-skilled migrant labour to

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Autism? 自闭症 Why it's not “Rain Woman”? 为什么它不是“雨女” Women have fewer cognitive disorders than men do because their bodies are better at ignoring the mutations which cause them? 与男性相比，患有认知障碍的女性较少，因为她们自身的身体能更好的忽略导致认知障碍的基因突变 AUTISM is a strange condition. Sometimes its symptoms of “social blindness”(an inability to read or comprehend the emotions of others) occur alone. This is dubbed high-functioning autism, or Asperger's syndrome. Though their fellow men and women may regard them as a bit odd, high-functioning autists are often successful (sometimes very successful) members of society. On other occasions, though, autism manifests as part of a range of cognitive problems. Then, the condition is debilitating. What is common to those on all parts of the so-called autistic spectrum is that they are more often men than women —so much more often that one school of thought suggests autism is an extreme manifestation of what it means, mentally, to be male. Boys are four times more likely to be diagnosed with autism than girls are. For high-functioning autism, the ratio is seven to one.?

经济学人

China in Laos Busted flush How a Sino-Lao special economic zone hit the skids May 26th 2011 | BOTEN, LAOS | from the print edition ?Tweet ? Soon all this will be jungle again AT HOME and abroad, China is a byword for fast-track development, where yesterday’s paddy field is tomorrow’s factory, highway or hotel. Less noticed is that such development can just as quickly go into reverse. Golden City, in Boten, just over the border from China in tiny Laos, is a case in point. When a Hong Kong-registered company signed a 30-year, renewable lease with the Lao government in 2003 to set up a 1,640-hectare special economic zone built with mainland money and expertise, Golden City was touted as a

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Cloth of gold 一块价值堪比黄金的布 Why the economic value of a face mask is$56.14 为什么说一个口罩的经济价值是56.14美元 After a brutal first six months of the year,governments across the world are hoping for an economic bounce-back.Rich-world GDP fell by about 10%in the first half of2020. 在经历今年上半年的残酷考验后，世界各国政府都期待经济能够触底反弹。2020年上半年，发达国家的GDP下降了约10%。 Yet much has changed since—including that more people are now wearing masks.Economists,obsessed with translating everything into GDP,wonder if more widespread face-covering could help the recovery.然而，自从越来越多的人戴上口罩后，情况发生了显著变化。经济学家痴迷于用GDP来解释一切事物，如今他们想知道，随着更多的人戴上了口罩，经济能否走向复苏。The thinking goes that masks can,in part,substitute for lockdowns. People wearing them need not be discouraged as much from using public transport.More shops and offices might be able to reopen,albeit while practising social distancing. 这种想法基于这样一个逻辑，戴口罩在一定程度上可以代替封锁措施。当人们戴上口罩后，就不必再对公共交通工具进行限制了。更多的商店和办公室也将重新开放，尽管是在保持社交距离的前提下。 Calculations from Goldman Sachs,a bank,suggest that a15 percentage-point rise in the share of the population that wears masks

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Tencent Video battles iQiyi in China’s streaming wars腾讯视频与爱奇艺之中国流媒体大战 But the two big Chinese streaming platform may onc day settle into a cosy duopoly 但两大平台在未来某天或将实现双头垄断 L aunched in2010,iQiyi has grown used to the foreign press calling it“the Netflix of China”.Not the worst nickname,given the videostreaming pioneer’s success.But Gong Yu,iQiyi’s founder and boss,insists that his firm is more accurately described as“Netflix plus”.A bold claim for a loss-making business worth one-fifteenth as much as America’s(cash-generating)entertainment powerhouse with a market value of$214bn.Still,Mr Gong has a point. 创立于2010年的爱奇艺常常被外国媒体称为“中国版网飞”。鉴于这家流媒体先驱的成功，这一称号也算名副其实。但爱奇艺创始人兼老板龚宇坚称，准确来说，爱奇艺是“加强版网飞”。对于这家仍在亏损的公司来说，这种说法有些张狂，作为美国娱乐业巨头的网飞现已实现盈利，市值高达2140亿美元，而爱奇艺市值仅为其十五分之一。不过，龚宇所言仍有些许道理。 Like Netflix,iQiyi offers customers a deep catalogue of licensed and original content.Unlike Netflix,which relies almost entirely on subscription fees,iQiyi has multiple revenue streams.“Membership fees”,which start from19.8yuan ($2.87)a month,accounted for just over half of iQiyi’s7.4bn yuan in revenues in the second quarter. 爱奇艺和网飞一样，也为客户提供海量版权及原创影视作品。但不同于几乎完全依赖会员费的网飞，爱奇艺拥有多项收入来源。在爱奇艺第二季度74亿元的营收中，每月19.8元（约合2.87美元）起的“会员费”占比刚刚过半。 The rest came mainly from an online store(which sells“entertainment-related merchandise”),a nascent mobile-gaming arm,an e-book business and advertisements;iQiyi operates a“freemium”model which allows stingier users to stream some content free of charge provided they agree to watch ads.